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Abstract
This paper develops a reputation strategic model of monetary policy with a continuous
¯nite or in¯nite time horizon. By using the optimal stopping theory and introducing the
notions of sequentially weak and strong rational equilibria, we give the conditions under which
the time inconsistency problem may be solved with trigger reputation strategies not only for
stochastic but also for nonstochastic settings even with a ¯nite horizon. We provide the
conditions for the existence of stationary sequentially strong rational equilibrium, and also
completely characterize the existence of stationary sequentially weak rational equilibrium.
We show that, under the assumption of the public's weak rational expectation or the certainty
setting, the government will keep the in°ation at zero if and only if a(1 ¡ µ) < 2. This
inequality is satis¯ed if the rate of the aggregate output gain from the unanticipated in°ation,
a, is small (less than 2) or the government puts more weight on stabilizing output than on
stabilizing in°ation (µ > 1). Furthermore, we investigate the robustness of the sequentially
strong rational equilibrium behavior solution by showing that the imposed assumption is
reasonable.
¤Financial support from the Texas Advanced Research Program as well as from the Bush Program in the
Economics of Public Policy, the Private Enterprise Research Center, and the Lewis Faculty Fellowship at Texas
A&M University is gratefully acknowledged.
1 Introduction
Time inconsistency is an interesting problem in macroeconomics in general, and monetary policy
in particular. Although technologies, preferences, and information are the same at di®erent time,
the policymaker's optimal policy chosen at time t1 di®ers from the optimal policy for t1 chosen
at t0 < t1. The study of time inconsistency is important. It not only provides positive theories
that help us to understand the incentives faced by policymakers and provide the natural starting
point for attempts to explain the actual behavior of policymakers and actual policy outcomes,
but also require one to design policy-making institutions. Such a normative task can help one
understand how institutional structures a®ect policy outcomes.
This problem was ¯rst noted by Kydland and Prescott (1977). Several solutions have been
proposed to deal with this problem since then. Barro and Gordon (1983) were the ¯rst to build
a game model to analyze \reputation" of monetary policy.1 The second solution is based on the
incentive contracting approach to monetary policy. Persson and Tabellini (1993), Walsh (1995)
and Svensson (1997) developed models using this approach. The third solution is built on the
legislative approach. The major academic contribution in this area was by Rogo® (1985).
Among these approaches, the \reputation" problem is key. If reputation consideration dis-
courages the monetary authorities from attempting surprise in°ation, then legal or contracting
constraints on monetary authorities are unnecessary and may be harmful.
The main questions on reputation are when and how the government chooses in°ation op-
timally to minimize welfare loss, and, whether the punishment can induce the government to
choose zero in°ation. The conclusions of Barro-Gorden models are: First, there exists a zero-
in°ation Nash equilibrium if the punishment for the government deviating from zero-in°ation is
large enough. However, this equilibrium is not sequentially rational over a ¯nite time horizon.
The only sequentially rational equilibrium is achieved if the government chooses discretionary
in°ation and the public expects it. Only over an in¯nite time horizon can one get a low-in°ation
equilibrium. Otherwise, the government would be sure in the last period to produce the dis-
cretionary outcome whatever the public's expectation were and, working backward, would be
expected to do the same in the ¯rst period. Second, there are multiple Nash equilibria and there
1Backus and Dri±ll (1983) extended the work of Barro and Gordon to a situation in which the public is
uncertain about the preferences of the government. Persson and Tabellini (1990) gave an excellent summarization
of these models. Al-Nowaihi and Levine (1994) discussed reputation equilibrium in the Barro-Gordon monetary
policy game.
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is no mechanism to choose between them.
Finite time horizon games are more reasonable than in¯nite ones in the real world. We can say
that every government's lifetime is ¯nite. Many experimental studies of games suggest that there
are cooperation equilibrium when the players are told that the game will end. Consequently,
how to induce cooperative behavior in a ¯nitely repeated game is an interesting problem even
for game theorists.
In this paper, we use the optimal stopping theory in the stochastic di®erential equations
literature to study the time inconsistency problem in monetary policy with the continuous ¯nite
or in¯nite time horizon model. The optimal stopping theory can cover many dynamic economic
applications under uncertainty. The optimal stopping theory, though relatively complete in its
theoretical development, has not yet been widely applied in economics. By using the optimal
stopping theory and introducing the notions of sequentially weak and strong rational equilibria,
we give the conditions under which the time inconsistency problem may be solved with trig-
ger reputation strategies within our setting not only for stochastic but also for nonstochastic
settings even with a ¯nite horizon. We provide the conditions for the existence of stationary
sequentially strong rational equilibrium, and further completely characterize the existence of
stationary sequentially weak rational equilibrium. We show that the government will keep the
in°ation at zero if and only if a(1 ¡ µ) < 2.
As a result, the government will keep in°ation at zero if the rate of the output gain from the
unanticipated in°ation is small (a < 2) or the government puts more weight on stabilizing output
than on stabilizing in°ation. It will act opportunistically if the rate of aggregate output gain
from the unanticipated in°ation is high or the government puts less weight on stabilizing output
than on stabilizing in°ation, and then be expected to behave (and will behave) accordingly in
every succeeding period. Thus, the objective rate of the output gain from the unanticipated
in°ation and the subjective preferential policy on the relative importance between stabilizing
output and stabilizing in°ation can be used together to determine whether or not the government
keeps in°ation at zero.
The results obtained in the paper are sharply contrasted to the negative results from the
certainty setting with a discrete time horizon. Our results on the existence of the stationary zero
in°ation policy as an equilibrium solution are also true for the nonstochastic continuous ¯nite
horizon settings, which demonstrate the advantage of our continuous time model compared to
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the nonstochastic discrete time ¯nite horizon model discussed in the literature. As we mentioned
above, in the certainty setting with discrete time, a reputational equilibrium is possible only if
the horizon is in¯nite. Thus, a striking advantage of using a continuous-time formulation is that
it yields a solution to the time inconsistency problem whereas a discrete-time counterpart does
not. Why does the much more complicated continuous-time formulation yield a positive result
that the discrete-time formulation could not? Intuitively speaking, it is because, in continuous
time, the government has an option to change a policy any intermediate periods while, in the
discrete-time formulation, the government can change a policy only in each stopped subinterval,
and thus the solution to the continuous-time formulations can be viewed as the sum of the
solutions to the discrete-time formulations for many small stopped subintervals. Thus, the
embedded option in continuous-time formulation may appear to explain why the continuous-
time formulation can yield a solution to the time inconsistence while the discrete-time versions
in the existing literature fails.2
We also investigate the robustness of the equilibrium behavior by showing that the imposed
assumption is reasonable. As long as the inequality a(1 ¡ µ) < 2 holds, we can expect a sta-
tionary zero-in°ation outcome by the sequentially strong rational behavior so that the rational
expectation reputation can discourage the monetary authority from attempting surprise. When
a(1 ¡ µ) ¸ 2, whether or not we can expect the monetary policy to have a tendency to become
stable depends not only on the lifetime of the government, but also on the beliefs of the gov-
ernment and the public, ceteris paribus. If the time horizon is long enough, we may expect the
monetary policy tends to stable beyond some point of time. Although the initial economy shocks
may not implement a stationary sequentially rational equilibrium at the beginning, under the
sequentially strong rational strategy behavior assumption, the reputation trigger equilibrium
have a tendency to reach a new stationary equilibrium beyond some point in time. If the life
time of the government is not long enough to reach such a point, we may be able to use an
incentive contract or a legislative approach to reach it.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will set up the model and
provides a solution for the optimal stopping problem faced by the government. In Section 3, we
2Such an advantage of the continuous-time formulations can be also found in other ¯elds such as the principal-
agent literature. For instance, Holmstrom and Milgrom's (1987) continuous-time Brownian model not only gen-
erate the second-best solution, but their solution is remarkably simple. SchÄattler and Sung (1997) provided the
above explanation for the principal-agent models.
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study the equilibrium behavior. The robustness of this monetary game is discussed in Section
4. Section 5 gives the conclusion.
2 Model
2.1 The Setup
We consider a continuous time game theoretical model with two players: the government and
the public. The government's strategy space is R+ £ L[0; T], from which the government is to
choose an action (¿;f¼tgt2T ). Here ¿ is the time that the government changes its monetary
policy from the zero-in°ation rule to a discretion rule; ¼t is the in°ation rate chosen by the
government at time t; T is the lifetime of the government which can be ¯nite or in¯nite; and
L[0;T ] is the class of Lebesgue integral functions de¯ned on [0; T]. The public's strategy space is
L[0;T ], from which the public is to choose an action (f¼et gt2T ). Here ¼et is the expected in°ation
rate formed by the public at time t.
Suppose that, at the beginning, the government commits an in°ation rate ¼0 = 0, and the
public believes it so that ¼e0 = ¼0 = 0. The government has the right to switch from the zero-
in°ation to a discretion rule ¼t 6= 0 at the time t between 0 and T. However, after he changes
his policy, he loses his reputation.
The government's payo® function is described by a quadratic discounted expected loss func-
tion of the form:
¤ = E
Z T
0
e¡½¢t
·
1
2
µ (yt¡ ¹yt ¡ k)2 + 12¼
2
t
¸
dt (1)
where ½ is the discount factor with 0 < ½ < 1, yt is aggregate output, ¹yt is the economy's natural
rate of output, and µ is a positive constant that represents the relative weight the government
puts on output expansions relative to in°ation stabilization. Here, the target in°ation ¼ is zero.3
(1) is a typical marco welfare function that has played an important role in the literature, and
means that the government desires to stabilize both output around ¹yt + k, which exceeds the
economy's equilibrium output of ¹yt by a constant k, and in°ation around zero.
The government's objective is to minimize this discounted expected loss function subject to
the constraint imposed by a Lucas-type aggregate supply function, the so-called Phillips curve,
3Without loss of generality, the target in°ation rate is assumed to be zero. The results obtained in the paper
will continue to be true if the monetary authority has a target in°ation that di®ers from zero.
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which describes the relationship between output and in°ation in each period:
yt ¡ ¹yt = a (¼t ¡¼et ) +Xt; (2)
where a is a positive constant that represents the e®ect of a money surprise on output, i.e., the
rate of the output gain from the unanticipated in°ation so that the larger is a, the greater is
the central bank's incentive to in°ate, and Xt is the shock at time t that is assumed to be an
Ito di®usion process:
dXt = ¾dBt; X0 = x;
which is a special case of the general Ito di®usion:
dXt = b(Xt)dt +¾(Xt)dBt
with b(Xt) = 0 and ¾(Xt) = ¾. Here, Bt is 1-dimensional Brownian Motion and ¾ is the di®usion
coe±cient with ¾ < 1.
The public has complete information about the policymaker's objectives. It is assumed that
the public forms his expectations rationally, and thus the assumption of rational expectation
implicitly de¯nes the loss function for the public as E[¼t ¡ ¼et ]2. The public's objective is to
minimize this expected in°ation error. Given the public's understanding of the government's
decision problem, its choice of ¼e is optimal.
We ¯rst examine the \one-shot" game. The single-period loss function `t for the government
is:
`t (¼t; ¼et ) =
1
2
µ (yt ¡ ¹yt ¡k)2 + 12¼
2
t (3)
=
1
2
µ[a(¼t ¡ ¼et ) +Xt ¡ k]2 + 12¼
2
t :
The equilibrium concept in this game is noncooperative Nash. Then the government minimizes
`t by taking ¼et as given, and thus we have the best response function for the policymaker:
¼Dt =
aµ
1 + a2µ
(a¼et ¡ Xt +k) : (4)
The public is assumed to understand the incentive facing the government so they use (4) in
forming their expectations about in°ation so that
¼et = E¼
D
t =
aµ
1 + a2µ
(a¼et ¡ EXt + k) : (5)
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Solving (5) for ¼et , we get the unique Nash equilibrium ¼e¤t = E¼D¤t = aµ(EXt ¡ k). Thus, as
long as EXt 6= k, the policymaker has incentives to use the discretion rule although the loss at
¼et = ¼t = 0 is lower than at ¼e¤t = E¼D¤t .
Note that, if Xt = k a.s. for t ¸ 0, the unique Nash equilibrium of the \one-shot" game for
the public and the government, is ¼e¤t = ¼¤t = 0 a.s., and thus, the time-inconsistency problem
will not appear. To make the problem non-trivial, without loss of generality, we assume that
Xt 6= k a.s. for t ¸ 0 in the rest of the paper.
A potential solution to the above time inconsistency problem is to force the government to
bear some consequence penalties if it deviates from its announced policy of low in°ation. One
of such penalties that may take is a loss of reputation, and so, in this paper, we will adopt the
reputation approach that incorporates notions of reputation into a repeated-game framework to
avoid this time consistency problem. If the government deviates from the low-in°ation solution,
credibility is lost and the public expects high in°ation in the future. That is, the public expects
zero-in°ation as long as government has ful¯lled the in°ation expectation in the past. However,
if actual in°ation exceeds what was expected, the public anticipates that the policymaker will
apply discretion in the future. So the public forms their expectation according to the trigger
strategy: Observing \good" behavior induces the expectation of continued good behavior and a
single observation of \bad" behavior triggers a revision of expectations.
2.2 The Optimal Stopping Problem for Government
In order to solve the time inconsistency problem by using the reputation approach, we ¯rst
incorporate the government's loss minimization problem into a general optimal stopping time
problem. During any time in [0;T ], the policymaker has the right to reveal his type (discretion
or zero-in°ation). Since he has the right but not the obligation to reveal his type, we can think
it is an option for the policymaker. So the policymaker's decision problem is to choose a best
time ¿ 2 [0;T ] to exercise this option.
The policymaker considers the following time-inhomogeneous optimal stopping problem:
Find ¿¤ such that
L¤(x) = inf
¿
Ex
·Z ¿
0
f(t;Xt)dt + g(¿;X¿ )
¸
= Ex
"Z ¿¤
0
f(t;Xt)dt + g(¿¤; X¿¤ )
#
; (6)
where
f(s; Xt) =
1
2
µe¡½¢s(Xt ¡ k)2 (7)
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is the instantaneous loss function for the policymaker when he uses the zero-in°ation rate which
is clearly Lipschits continuous, and
g(s;X¿) = e¡½sEX¿
"Z T
s
e¡½(t¡s)
"
µ
2
[a(¼Dt ¡ ¼et ) + Xt ¡k]2 + ¼
D2
t
2
#
dt
#
(8)
is the expected loss function for policymaker in which he begin to use the discretion rule at time
s. Note that g(¢) ¸ 0 since the loss function `t ¸ 0. We assume that g(¢) is a bounded function,
i.e., g(¢) · M for some constant number M .
We assume that the public uses stationary strategy: ¼et = ¼e for t ¸ ¿ . To compute g(¿; X¿ ),
putting (4) into (8), we have
g(¿; X¿ ) = e¡½¿EX¿
·Z T
¿
e¡½(t¡¿)
·
µ
2
[a(¼Dt ¡ ¼e)+ Xt ¡ k]2 + 12¼
D2
t
¸
dt
¸
=
1
2
µ
1 +a2µ
e¡½¿EX¿
·Z T
¿
e¡½(t¡¿) (¡Xt + k + a¼e)2 dt
¸
=
µ
2(1 + a2µ)
e¡½¿ ¢
½
EX¿
·Z T
¿
e¡½(t¡¿)X2t dt
¸
¡ 2(k +a¼e)EX¿
·Z T
¿
e¡½(t¡¿ )Xtdt
¸
+(k + a¼e)2EX¿
·Z T
¿
e¡½(t¡¿ )dt
¸¾
(9)
We now calculate the conditional expectation for X2t and Xt. Let A be the characteristic operator
of Ito di®usion dXt = b(Xt)dt + ¾(Xt)dB (with b = 0). Then
Af =
X
i
bi
@f
@xi
+
1
2
X
i;j
¡
¾¾T
¢
i;j
@2f
@xi@xj
=
1
2
X
i;j
¡
¾¾T
¢
i;j
@2f
@xi@xj
Then, by Dynkin formula (Âksendal 1998, p. 118), we have
EX¿ [Xt] = X¿ +EX¿
·Z t
¿
AXsds
¸
= X¿ (10)
EX¿
£
X2t
¤
= X2¿ +E
X¿
·Z t
¿
AX2sds
¸
= X2¿ + ¾
2(t ¡ ¿): (11)
Substituting (10) and (11) into (9), we have
g(¿;X¿) =
1
2
µ
1 +a2µ
½
¾2
·
1
½2
¡
e¡½¿ ¡ e¡½T ¢ ¡ 1
½
(T ¡ ¿)e¡½T
¸
(12)
+(X¿ ¡k ¡ a¼e)21½(e
¡½¿ ¡ e¡½T )
¾
:
Note that, if we de¯ne
f1(s; Xt) = ¡f(s;Xt);
g1(s; X¿ ) = ¡g(s; X¿ ) +M ¸ 0;
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then the loss minimization problem in (6) can be reduced to the following maximization problem:
Find ¿¤ such that
G¤0(x) = sup
¿2[0;T ]
Ex
·Z ¿
0
[¡f(t;Xt)]dt ¡ g(¿;X¿ ) + M
¸
= sup
¿2[0;T ]
Ex
·Z ¿
0
f1(t;Xt)dt + g1(¿;X¿ )
¸
: (13)
In the following, we will use the optimal stopping approach to solve the optimization problem
(13).
2.3 Solve the Optimal Stopping Problem
In order to solve the government's optimization problem (13) by using a standard framework of
the optimal stopping problem involving an integral (cf. Âksendal (1998, p. 213)), we make the
following transformations: Let
W¿ =
Z ¿
0
f1(t;Xt)dt +w; w 2 R
and de¯ne the Ito di®usion Zt = Z
(s;x;w)
t in R
3 by
Zt =
266664
s + t
Xt
Wt
377775
for t ¸ 0: Then
dZt =
266664
dt
dXt
dWt
377775 =
266664
1
0
¡12µe¡½t(Xt ¡k)2
377775dt +
266664
0
¾
0
377775dBt; Z0 = (s;x;w):
So Zt is an Ito di®usion starting at z := Z0 = (s; x; w). Let Rz = R(s;x;w) denote the probability
law of fZtg and let Ez = E(s;x;w) denote the expectation with respect to Rz. In terms of Zt the
problem (13) can be written
G¤0(x) = G¤(0; x; 0) = sup
¿
E(0;x;0)[W¿ + g1(¿;X¿ )] = sup E(0;x;0)[G(Z¿)]
which is a special case of the problem
G¤(s;x; w) = sup
¿
E(s;x;w)[W¿ + g1(¿;X¿ )] = sup E(s;x;w)[G(Z¿ )]
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with
G(z) = G(s;x;w) := w + g1(s; x):
Then, for
f1(s;x) = ¡12µe
¡½¢s(x¡ k)2
g1(s;x) = ¡12
µ
1 +a2µ
½
¾2
·
1
½2
¡
e¡½s ¡ e¡½T ¢ ¡ 1
½
(T ¡ s)e¡½T
¸
+(x¡ k ¡ a¼e)2 1
½
¡
e¡½s ¡ e¡½T¢¾ + M
and
G(s;x;w) = w + g1(s; x);
the characteristic operator AZ of Zt is given by
AZG =
@G
@s
+
1
2
¾2
@2G
@x2
¡ 1
2
µe¡½s(x ¡k)2@G
@w
=
1
2
µ
1 +a2µ
(x¡ k ¡ a¼e)2e¡½s ¡ 1
2
µ(x ¡k)2e¡½s
=
1
2
µ
1 +a2µ
£
(x ¡k ¡ a¼e)2 ¡ (1 + a2µ)(x ¡ k)2¤e¡½s: (14)
Let
U = f(s; x; w) : G(s; x;w) < G¤(s; x; w)g
and
V = f(s; x; w) : AG(x) > 0g :
Then, by (14) we have
V = f(s;x;w) : AZG(s; x; w) > 0g (15)
= R £ fx : (x ¡k ¡a¼e)2 > (1 + a2µ)(x ¡k)2g £R:
Remark 1 Âksendal (1998, p. 205) shows that: V ½ U, which means that it is never optimal
to stop the process before it exits from V . For each x 6= k, if we choose a suitable ¼e(x) such
that (x¡k ¡a¼e(x))2 > (1 +a2µ)(x¡k)2, then we have U = V = R£f(¡1; k)[ (k;1)g £R.
Therefore, any stopping time less T will not be optimal for all (s; x;w) 2 V , and thus ¿¤ = T is
the optimal stopping time. We will use this fact to study the time inconsistency problem of the
monetary policy game in the following sections.
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Remark 2 In fact, we can verify directly that dL(x)d¿ < 0 when ¼
e is bigger enough, where L(x)
is de¯ned by
L(x) = Ex
·Z ¿
0
f(t;Xt)dt + g(¿;X¿ )
¸
= Ex
·Z ¿
0
f(t;Xt)dt + g(¿X¿ )
¸
:
Thus, ¿¤ = T is the optimal stopping time.
3 The Equilibrium Behavior of the Monetary Policy Game
In order to study the equilibrium behavior of the monetary policy game, we ¯rst give the
following lemma that shows that the government will keep the zero-in°ation policy when the
public uses trigger strategies and reputation penalties imposed by the public are large enough.
Lemma 1 Let ¿ = inffs > 0 : ¼s 6= 0g. Then, for all x with x 6= k, any trigger strategy of the
public, f¼et (x)g, which has the form of
¼et =
8>>><>>:
0 if t = 0
0 if 0 < t < ¿
¼e(x) 2 fh : (x¡ k ¡ ah)2 > (1 + a2µ)(x ¡k)2g if t > s and t ¸ ¿
; (16)
discourages the policymaker from attempting surprise in°ation.
Proof: For each x 2 R with x 6= k, if we choose any ¼e 2 fh : (x¡k¡ah)2 > (1+a2µ)(x¡k)2g,
we have
(x¡ k ¡a¼e(x))2 > (1 + a2µ)(x ¡k)2 for all x 2 R with x 6= k:
Then, V in (15) becomes V = R £f(¡1; k) [ (k; 1)g £ R, and thus any stopping time less T
is not optimal for the government. Hence, ¿¤ = T . Thus, when the public applies this trigger
strategy, it is never optimal for government to stop the zero-in°ation policy. Q.E.D
Although there are (in¯nitely) many trigger strategies given in Lemma 1 that can discourage
the policymaker from attempting surprise in°ation, most of them are not optimal for the public
in terms of minimizing the public's expected in°ation error: ¼t¡¼et . To rule out the those non-
optimal strategies, we have to impose some assumptions how the public form an expectation and
what an equilibrium solution should be used to describe the public's self-interested behavior.
Di®erent assumptions on the public's behavior may result in di®erent the optimal solutions. In
the following, we introduce two types of sequentially rational equilibrium solution concepts.
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Let fFtg be a ¯ltration, i.e., a nondecreasing family fFt : t ¸ 0g of sub-¾-¯ elds of F:
Fs ½ Ft ½ F for 0 · s < t < 1, which is assumed to be generated by the process itself, i.e.,
Ft := ¾(Xs : 0 · s · t). Then, Ft can be regarded the set of accumulated information up to
time t.
Suppose the government knows the distribution of the shock, Xt, exactly, that is,
d ePG = dP;
where ePG is the belief of the government for the movement of the shock, P is the measure of
the shock.
We suppose that the public does not know the distribution of the shock, but it's belief ePP
is absolutely continuous with respect to P 4, which means that if an event does not occur in
probability, then the public will believe that this event will not happen.
Then, by Randon-Nikodym Theorem (Lipster & Ahiryaev 2001, p. 13), there exist Randon-
Nikodym derivatives, M(t), such that
d ePP = M(t)dP; (a:s:);
and M(t) is a martingale. This means that, whenever new information becomes available, the
belief of the public is adjusted. We can interpreter M(t) is the information structure of the
society, it is a measurement of how the public knows the real shock.
We suppose that M(t) is P -square-integrable and Xt is ePP -integrable. We also suppose that
hXt; M(t)i = 05, heuristically, this assumption can be interpreted as: the history of the shock
can't help the public to predict the movement of the future shock.6
We denote by eE the expectation operator with respect to ePP .
A strategy (¿;f¼t; ¼et g) is said to be a sequentially strong rational equilibrium strategy for the
dynamic model de¯ned above if
(1) the belief of the public for the movement of the shocks Xt, eP P , satis¯es Bayes'
rule: eE[XtjFs] = 1M(s)E[XtM(t)jFs] (17)
4 ePP (A) = 0 for each A 2 Ft , such that P(A) = 0.
5hX;Y i is cross-variation, which is de¯ned by hXt ;Yti = limjj¦jj!0P1·k·m(Xt(k) ¡Xt(k¡1))(Yt(k) ¡ Yt(k¡1)),
where Xt and Yt are square-integrable, and ¦ = [t0 ; t1; :::; tm] is a partition of [0,t].
6Note that, if one assumes that the public knows the distributions of the shocks, Xt, exactly, then M(t) = 1.
This is a usual assumption made in the literature.
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for all s < t;
(2) The expectation of the public is strong rational: ¼et = EXs¼Dt := eE[¼Dt jFs] for
all s < t;
(3) it optimizes the objectives of the public and the government.
A strategy (¿;f¼t;¼et g) is said to be a sequentially weak rational equilibrium strategy for the
dynamic model de¯ned above if
(1) the belief of the public for the movement of the shocks Xt, eP P , satis¯es Bayes'
rule: eE[XtjF0] = 1M(0)E[XtM(t)jF0]; (18)
(2) The expectation of the public is weak rational: ¼et = Ex¼Dt := eE[¼Dt jF0] for all
s < t;
(3) it optimizes the objectives of the public and the government.
The di®erence between sequentially strong rational equilibrium and sequentially weak ratio-
nal equilibrium is that the sequentially weak rational equilibrium uses the information only at
time 0 to form the public's belief and expectation on the government's policy while the sequen-
tially strong rational equilibrium uses accumulated information up to the present to form the
public's belief and expectation on the government's policy. Thus, the sequentially weak rational
equilibrium, in general, is a weaker equilibrium solution concept to describe the public's be-
havior. This implies that every sequentially strong rational equilibrium is clearly a sequentially
weak rational equilibrium, but the reverse may not be true. However, when the shocks, fXtg,
are nonstochastic, these two equilibrium solutions are equivalent.
Now we use these two types of sequentially rational equilibria to study the time consistency
problem in monetary policy. Propositions 1 and 2 below show the existence of such equilibria.
Proposition 1 Suppose the shocks fXtg satisfy the inequality:
[(x¡ k) +aµ(Xt ¡ k)]2 > (1 + a2µ)(x ¡k)2 for all t 2 [0;T ] and x 2 R with x 6= k: (19)
Let (¿;f¼sg) be the strategy of the government, where ¿ is the ¯rst time that the government
changes its policy from zero-in°ation to discretion rule, i.e., ¿ = inffs > 0 : ¼s 6= 0g. Let the
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strategy of the public f(¼et )g be given by
¼et =
8>>><>>:
0 if t = 0
0 if 0 < t < ¿
aµ(k ¡ X¿ ) if t ¸ ¿
: (20)
Then, (¿¤; f¼¤t ; ¼e¤t g) with ¿¤ = T , ¼¤t = 0 and ¼e¤t = 0 for all t ¸ 0 is a sequentially strong
rational equilibrium strategy for the policymaker and the public.
Proof: To prove (¿;f¼t;¼et g) de¯ned above results in a sequentially strong rational equi-
librium, ¿¤ = T, ¼¤t = 0 and ¼e¤t = 0 for all t ¸ 0, we need to show that (1) it satis¯es
Bayes' rule, (2) the strong rational expectation condition holds: ¼et = EX¿¼Dt := eE[¼Dt jF¿ ], (3)
¼et 2 fh : (x¡ k ¡ah)2 > (1 +a2µ)(x ¡k)2g, and (4) (¿¤;f¼¤t ;¼e¤t g) optimizes the objectives of
the public and the government.
We ¯rst claim that the public updates its belief by Bayes' Rule. Indeed, since M(t) is a
martingale and, for s < t, Xt is a eP P -integrable random variable, then, by Lemma of Shreve &
Kruzhilin (1999, p. 438), the Bayes' Rule holds:
eE[XtjFs] = 1M(s)E[XtM(t)jFs]:
To show ¼et = EX¿¼Dt , ¯rst note that Xt and M(t) are square-integrable martingale, using
the fact that XtM(t) ¡ hXt; M(t)i is a martingale (Karatzas & Shreve(1991, p. 31)) and the
assumption \Xt;M(t)i = 0, We can get that XtM(t) is a martingale, by Bayes' Rule:
eE[XtjF¿ ] = 1M(¿)E[XtM(t)jF¿ ] = 1M(¿)X¿M(¿) = X¿ :
which means fXtg is also a martingale under ePP . Since the policymaker's best response function
is given by
¼Dt =
aµ
1 +a2µ
(a¼et ¡ Xt +k);
fXtg is a martingale under ePP , and ¼et = aµ(k ¡X¿ ) is complete information at time t, we have
EX¿¼Dt = EX¿
aµ
1 +a2µ
(a¼et ¡ Xt +k)
=
aµ
1 +a2µ
(a¼et ¡ EX¿Xt +k)
=
aµ
1 +a2µ
(a¼et ¡ X¿ + k): (21)
Substituting ¼et = aµ(k ¡ X¿ ) into (21), we have EX¿¼Dt = aµ1+a2µ [a2µ(k ¡ X¿) ¡ X¿ + k) =
aµ(k ¡ X¿ ) = ¼et .
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Now, if condition (19) is satis¯ed, we have (x ¡ k ¡ a¼et )2 > (1 + a2µ)(x ¡ k)2 and thus
¼et 2 fh : (x¡ k ¡ ah)2 > (1 + a2µ)(x ¡k)2g for all x 2 R with x 6= k. Then, by Lemma 1, and
the optimal stopping time is ¿¤ = T. Therefore, we must have ¼¤t = 0 for all t 2 [0;T ].
Since the public only cares about his in°ation prediction errors, so ¼et = µ(k¡Xt) minimizes
the public's expected loss when the policy change occurs at time t in this game. Hence, if both
the policymaker and public believe that future shocks will grow enough to make the inequality
(19) hold, the threat of the public is creditable. Hence, we must have ¼e¤t = 0 for all t 2 [0; T]
since ¿¤ = T. Thus, we have shown that the trigger strategies (¿; f¼t; ¼etg) result in a sequentially
strong rational equilibrium, which is ¿¤ = T, ¼¤t = 0, and ¼e¤t = 0 for all t ¸ 0. Q.E.D.
Thus, Proposition 1 implies that, as long as all disturbance shocks Xt are bigger enough,
the public can use a trigger strategy to induce a stationary zero-in°ation sequentially strong
rational equilibrium. Of course, the assumption that [(x¡k)+aµ(Xt¡k)]2 > (1 +a2µ)(x¡k)2
for all t 2 [0; T] and x 2 R with x 6= k seems very strong. Proposition 3 in the next section
shows that this is a reasonable assumption. As long as this inequality holds for the initial shock
x, the public and the government will have a strong belief that it will be true for all t 2 (0; T]
and x 2 R.
The sequentially strong rational equilibrium has imposed a strong assumption on the public's
self-interested behavior. If the public's self-interested behavior is described by the sequentially
weak rational equilibrium, we can have the following proposition which completely characterizes
the existence of the stationary zero in°ation strategy as an equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 2 Let (¿;f¼sg) be the strategy of the government, where ¿ = inffs > 0 : ¼s 6= 0g.
Let the strategy of the public f(¼et )g be given by
¼et =
8>>><>>:
0 if t = 0
0 if 0 < t < ¿
aµ(k ¡x) if t ¸ ¿
: (22)
Then, the stationary zero-in°ation policy, i.e., ¿¤, ¼¤t = 0 and ¼e¤t = 0 for all t ¸ 0, is a
sequentially weak rational equilibrium strategy for the policymaker and the public if and only if
a(1 ¡ µ) < 2.
Proof: We ¯rst note that (1 + aµ)2 > 1 + a2µ if and only if a(1 ¡ µ) < 2. Substituting
¼et = aµ(k ¡x) for t ¸ ¿ into (x¡ k ¡ a¼et )2, we have
(x ¡k ¡ a¼et )2 = (1 + aµ)2(x ¡ k)2
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> (1 + a2µ)(x ¡ k)2
for all x 2 R n fkg if and only if a(1 ¡ µ) < 2. Then, we have
U = V =
8<: R £f(¡1; k)[ (k; 1)g if a(1 ¡ µ) < 2R £f;g £ R otherwise : (23)
and thus the optimal stopping time is given by
¿¤ =
8<: T if a(1 ¡ µ) < 20 otherwise : (24)
Hence, ¿¤ = T , ¼¤t = 0 and ¼r¤t = 0 for all t 2 [0;T ] if and only if a(1¡ µ) < 2. The proofs of the
other parts are the same as those in Proposition 1. Therefore, the trigger strategies (¿; f¼t; ¼etg)
result in a stationary zero-in°ation sequentially weak rational equilibrium, which is given by ¿¤,
¼¤t = 0 and ¼e¤t = 0 for all t ¸ 0, if and only if a(1 ¡ µ) < 2. Q.E.D.
Thus, as long as a(1 ¡ µ) < 2, the public can use a trigger strategy to induce a stationary
zero-in°ation equilibrium outcome that is sequentially weak rational. Figure 1 shows the range
of the parameters a and µ, which guarantees the existence of a stationary sequentially weak
rational equilibrium. Note that, if the government's relative weight parameter µ ¸ 1, i.e., if
the government thinks that stabilizing output is at least as important as stabilizing in°ation,
or if the economic environment parameter a · 2 so that the rate of the output gain from the
unanticipated in°ation is not too high, this inequality always holds and stationary sequentially
weak rational equilibrium can be guaranteed. When the inequality a(1¡µ) ¸ 2, the sequentially
weak rational trigger equilibrium, which is given by ¼e¤0 = ¼0 = 0 and ¼e¤t = ¼¤t = µ(k ¡ x) for
0 < t · T, is not stationary.
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
As such, the government will act opportunistically if the rate of the output gain from the
unanticipated in°ation is high (a > 2) or the government puts less weight on stabilizing output
than on stabilizing in°ation (µ < 1), and then be expected to behave (and will behave) that
way in every succeeding periods. It will keep the in°ation at zero if the rate of the output
gain from the unanticipated in°ation is small or the government puts more weight on stabilizing
output than on stabilizing in°ation. Thus, the objective rate of the output gain from the
unanticipated in°ation, combining together with and the subjective preferential policy on the
relative importance between stabilizing output and stabilizing in°ation, can determine whether
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or not the government keeps in°ation at zero. In the literature, some papers assume that the
economic environment parameter a is normalized to one. However, from our results, the choice
of a will a®ect whether or not a monetary policy is time consistency, and thus it cannot be
arbitrally normalized to be one.
When shocks Xt becomes nonstochastic, i.e., Xt = X0 = x, the sequentially strong rational
equilibrium and sequentially weak rational equilibrium are the same. Thus, from Propositions 1
and 2, we have the following corollary that shows that the existence of a stationary zero in°ation
equilibrium is completely characterized by the inequality a(1 ¡ µ) < 2.
Corollary 1 Let (¿; f¼sg) be the strategy of the government, where ¿ = inffs > 0 : ¼s 6= 0g.
Let the strategy of the public f(¼et )g be given by
¼et =
8>>><>>>:
0 if t = 0
0 if 0 < t < ¿
aµ(k ¡x) if t ¸ ¿
: (25)
Then, the stationary zero-in°ation policy, i.e., ¿¤, ¼¤t = 0 and ¼e¤t = 0 for all t ¸ 0, is a
sequentially (strong) rational equilibrium strategy for the policymaker and the public if and only
if a(1 ¡ µ) < 2.
This possibility result on the existence of the stationary zero in°ation policy as an equilibrium
shows the advantage of our nonstochastic continuous ¯nite horizon setting compared to the
nonstochastic discrete time ¯nite horizon settings discussed in the literature. It is well known
that, in the certainty setting with discrete time, a reputational equilibrium is possible only if the
horizon is in¯nite. Otherwise, the government would be sure in the last period to produce the
discretionary outcome whatever the public's expectation were and, working backward, would
be expected to do the same in the ¯rst period. Thus, our results are sharply contrasted to the
negative results from the certainty setting with discrete time horizon.
4 Robustness of Equilibrium Solutions
In this section we study the robustness of sequentially strong rational equilibrium. In order to
get the sequentially strong rational equilibrium in Proposition 1, we imposed the assumption
that B = fXt : [(x¡ k) + aµ(Xt ¡ k)]2 > (1 + a2µ)(x ¡k)2g for all 0 · t · T and x 2 R with
x 6= k. It might appear that the result in Proposition 1 is sensitive to this assumption. Is this
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assumption reasonable? The following proposition shows that the result is quite robust in the
sense that, as long as the initial starting point x is in B, the expected ¯rst exit time from B will
be in¯nite.
Proposition 3 Let B = fXt : [(x ¡ k) + aµ(Xt ¡k)]2 > (1 +a2µ)(x ¡ k)2 for t ¸ 0g, and let
´ = infft > 0 : Xt =2 Bg be the ¯rst time Xt exits from B. Suppose that x 2 B, i.e., a(1¡µ) < 2.
Then, we have
Ex[´] = 1
for all x 2 R with x 6= k.
Proof: Solving [(x¡ k) +aµ(Xt ¡k)]2 > (1 + a2µ)(x ¡k)2 for Xt, we have
Xt >
1
aµ
h
(1 + aµ)k ¡x +
p
1 + a2µjx ¡kj
i
or
Xt <
1
aµ
h
(1 + aµ)k ¡x ¡p1 + a2µjx ¡kji :
Let C = 1aµ
h
(1 +aµ)k ¡ x+ p1 + a2µjx ¡kj
i
and D = 1aµ
h
(1 + aµ)k ¡x ¡p1 + a2µjx¡ kj
i
:
Since X0 = x 2 B for all x 2 R, there are two cases to be considered: (1) x > C and (2)
x < D.
Case 1. x > C . Let ´c = infft > 0: Xt · Cg, and let ´n be the ¯rst exit time from the
interval
fXt : C · Xt · ng
for all integers n with n > C. We ¯rst show that P x(X´n = C) = n¡xn¡C and P x(X´n = n) =
x¡C
n¡C .
Consider function h 2 C20(R) de¯ned by h(x) = x for C · x · n (C20(R) means the functions in
C2(R) with compact support in R). By Dynkin's formula,
Ex [h(X´n)] = h(x) +E
x
·Z ´n
0
Ah(Xs)ds
¸
= h(x) = x; (26)
we have
CP x(X´n = C) + nP x(X´n = n) = x:
Thus,
Px(X´n = C) =
n ¡ x
n ¡C
and
P x(X´n = n) = 1 ¡ Px(X´n = C) = x ¡ Cn ¡ C :
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Now Consider h 2 C20 (R) such that h(x) = x2 for C · x · n. Applying Dynkin's formula
again, we have
Ex [h(X´n)] = h(x) +E
x
·Z ´n
0
Ah(Xs)ds
¸
= x2 +¾2Ex [´n] ; (27)
and thus
¾2Ex [´n] = C2Px(X´n = C) + n2Px(X´n = n) ¡x2:
Hence, we have
Ex [´n] =
1
¾2
·
C2
n ¡ x
n ¡ C + n
2x¡ C
n ¡ C ¡ x
2
¸
:
Letting n ! 1, we conclude that P x(X´n = n) = x¡Cn¡C ! 0 and ´c = lim´n < 1 a.s.
Therefore, we have
Ex[´c] = lim
n!1E
x [´n] = 1:
Case 2. X0 = x < D. De¯ne ´D = infft > 0; Xt ¸ Dg. Let ´n be the ¯rst exit time from
the interval
fXt : ¡n · Xt · Dg
for all integers n with ¡n < D. By the same method, we can prove that
Ex [´n] =
1
¾2
·
D2
n + x
n +D
+n2
D ¡x
n +D
¡x2
¸
:
Letting n ! 1, we conclude that Px(X´n = n) = D¡xn+D ! 0 and ´D = lim ´n < 1 a.s., and
thus
Ex[´D] = lim
n!1E
x [´n] = 1:
Thus, in either case, we have Ex[´] = 1. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 thus implies that, because the expected exit time from B is in¯nite since the
expectation Ex[´] = 1 for all x 2 R with x 6= k, the policymaker will have the belief that
the future shocks will stay in B forever, and consequently they will likely make decisions and
behave according to this belief. As a result, the sequentially strong rational equilibrium will
likely appear in the game when the public has the same belief as the government. So, in this
sense, we can regard the class B as an absorbing class for Xt as long as x 2 B. Note that, for
x 6= k, x 2 B if and only if a(1 ¡ µ) < 2.7 Therefore, (1 +aµ)2(x¡k)2 > (1+a2µ)(x¡k)2 if and
only if a(1 ¡ µ) < 2. Thus, as long as a(1 ¡ µ) < 2, the sequentially strong rational equilibrium
solution is stable.
7Indeed, a(1¡ µ) < 2 is equivalent to (1+ aµ)2 > 1 + a2µ.
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What happens if the initial shock x is not in B (i.e., if 2 ¸ a(1 ¡ µ))? We have following
proposition:
Proposition 4 De¯ne ¿ = infft > 0 : Zt 2 Bg. Then for x =2 B, i.e., a(1 ¡ µ) ¸ 2, we have
Ex[¿ ] =
a(1 ¡ µ) ¡ 2
¾2aµ
(k ¡x)2
for all D · x · C.
Proof: Since x 62 B, we have D · x · C. De¯ne ¿C = infft > 0 : Xt ¸ Cg and ¿D = infft >
0 : Xt · Dg. Then ¿ = ¿c ^ ¿D := minf¿c; ¿Dg. We ¯rst show that Px(X¿ = C) = x¡DC¡D and
Px(X¿ = D) = C¡xC¡D . Consider h 2 C20(R) such that h(x) = x for D · x · C . By Dynkin's
formula,
Ex [h(X¿c^¿D)] = h(x) +Ex
·Z ¿c ¿^D
0
Ah(Xs)ds
¸
= h(x) = x; (28)
we have
CPx(X¿ = C)+ DP x(X¿ = D) = x:
Thus,
Px(X¿ = C) =
x ¡D
C ¡ D:
and thus
Px(X¿ = D) = 1 ¡ Px(X¿ = C) = C ¡xC ¡D:
Now consider h 2 C20(R) such that h(x) = x2 for D · x · C . By Dynkin's formula:
Ex [h(X¿c^¿D )] = h(x) +Ex
·Z ¿c¤¿D
0
Ah(Xs)ds
¸
= h(x) +¾2Ex [¿c ^ ¿D] ; (29)
we have
¾2Ex [¿c ^ ¿D] = C2Px(X¿ = C) + D2Px(X¿ = D) ¡ x2
and thus
Ex [¿c^ ¿D] = 1¾2
·
C2 x ¡D
C ¡ D + D
2 C ¡x
C ¡D ¡ x
2
¸
=
1
¾2
£
(C + D)x¡ CD ¡x2¤
=
2x
¾2aµ
[(1 + aµ)k ¡x] ¡ 1
¾2a2µ2
[(1 + aµ)k ¡x]2 + 1 +a
2µ
¾a2µ2
(x¡ k)2 ¡ 1
¾
x2
= 1
¾2a2µ2
©
[(1 +aµ)k ¡ x][2xaµ ¡ (1 +aµ)k + x] ¡ a2µ2x2 + (1 +a2µ)(k ¡ x)2ª
=
1
¾2a2µ2
©¡(1 + aµ)2k2 ¡ (1 +2aµ)x2 + (1 +aµ)kx+ (1 + aµ)(1 + 2aµ)xk
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¡a2µ2x2 + (1 +a2µ)(x¡ k)2ª
=
1
¾2a2µ2
©¡(1 + aµ)2k2 ¡ (1 +aµ)2x2 + 2(1 + aµ)2kx+ (1 +a2µ)(x¡ k)2ª
=
1
¾2a2µ2
©¡(1 + aµ)2(k ¡ x)2 + (1 + a2µ)(x ¡k)2ª
=
a(1 ¡ µ) ¡ 2
¾2aµ
(k ¡ x)2 ¸ 0: (30)
by noting that a(1 ¡ µ) ¸ 2. Q.E.D.
Notice that, from (30), one can see that, the bigger shock (measured by ¾), the faster the
convergence rate. In particular, if ¾2 ! 0, Ex [¿c ^ ¿D ] ! 1. This means that, when the
shocks fXtg degenerate to a non-stochastic process and the public has the same belief as the
government, the government and the public will believe that Xt 62 B for all t 2 [0;T ], and thus
a stationary sequentially strong rational equilibrium does not exist. This is actually the result
we have already obtained in Corollary 1. On the other hand, if ¾2 ! 1, then Ex [¿c ^ ¿D] ! 0.
This means that, when the shocks fXtg become very large and the public has the same belief as
the government, the public and the government may believe that Xt will be in B for t 2 (0; T].
As such, the policymaker and the public will likely have the beliefs that the shocks Xt will be in
B right after the initial shock x, and consequently, the stationary sequentially strong rational
equilibrium will likely appear in the time horizon (0;T ].
When 0 < ¾ < 1, from Proposition 4, the expected time of entering B, Ex[¿ ] = Ex [¿c ^ ¿D]
is a ¯nite number. Suppose the public has the same belief as the government. There are two
cases to be considered: (1) Ex[¿ ] ¸ T . In this case, the government and the public likely believe
that Xt 62 B for all t 2 [0;T ], and thus a stationary sequentially strong rational equilibrium will
unlikely exist. (2) Ex[¿ ] < T . In this case, we should not expect the zero-in°ation stationary
monetary policy for the time period between [0;Ex[¿ ]] since Xt 62 B for all t 2 [0; Ex[¿ ]].
However, once Xt enters B at the ¯rst time Ex[¿ ], we can regard X¿ as a new starting point.
Then, by Proposition 3, the policymaker and the public will believe Xt will stay in B for all
t 2 [Ex[¿ ];T ], and thus we can expect to have a non-zero in°ation stationary monetary policy
on [Ex[¿ ];T ]. This implies that, although we do not have a time consistency policy on the whole
time horizon [0; T] when x 62 B, we could have a time consistency monetary policy beyond the
point Ex[¿ ]. In other words, one will have an instationary policy period if the initial shock
x 62 B, however, after a certain point ¿ , the monetary policy may become stationary. Thus, the
time inconsistency can happen at most once.
Summarizing the above discussion, we can draw the following conclusions:
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(i) When a(1 ¡ µ) < 2, any initial shock x with x 6= k is in the class B, one can
expect all future shocks Xt are in B and thus can expect a stationary zero-in°ation
outcome by the sequentially strong rational behavior.
(ii) When a(1 ¡ µ) ¸ 2, any initial shock x with x 6= k is not in the class B, whether
or not we can expect the monetary policy to have a tendency to become stable
depends on T, the lifetime of the government. If the expected ¯rst entry time to
B, Ex[¿ ] is greater than the lifetime of the government, we do not expect to have
a stationary monetary policy and thus we have the time inconsistency problem.
If the ¯rst entering time into B, Ex[¿ ] is less than the lifetime of the government,
we may expect a stationary monetary policy beyond the point Ex[¿ ], and the
policy becomes stationary. Thus, the monetary policy can jump at most once.
Thus, for this continuous time dynamic stochastic game, the sequentially strong rational
equilibrium behavior can be well predicted for any initial shock.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the equilibrium behavior of the time inconsistency problem in a con-
tinuous time stochastic world. We introduce the notions of sequentially weak and strong rational
equilibria, and show that the time inconsistency problem may be solved with trigger reputation
strategies not only for stochastic but also for nonstochastic settings even with ¯nite horizon. We
provide the conditions for the existence of stationary sequentially strong rational equilibrium,
and also completely characterize the existence of stationary sequentially weak rational equilib-
rium. We show that, when x 6= k, the government will keep the in°ation at zero if and only
if a(1 ¡ µ) < 2. Thus, the reputation can discourage the monetary authority from attempting
surprise in°ation as long as this inequality holds. Furthermore, we investigate the robustness
of the sequentially strong rational equilibrium behavior solution by showing that the imposed
assumption is reasonable and the sequentially rational equilibrium is very stable.
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